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In 1972 Abe Pomerantz settled a shareholder derivative
action brought on behalf of a mutual fund for $1 million. The
court awarded the firm the $250,000 fee that Abe had
requested. The mutual fund had some five million shares
outstanding.
Critics of the shareholder suit could have reported the
next day, "Shareholders Get Pennies on the Dollar, Lawyers
Get Windfall Fee." That case was Rosenfeld v. Black,' and the
decision Abe won in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was a
landmark. As Judge Murray Gurfein said in approving the
settlement and the fee in the district court, Pomerantz and his
partner Bill Hawdely made the law.
And, indeed, they did. Rosenfeld set a standard of conduct
which reverberated throughout the mutual fund industry. The
case held that an advisor to a mutual fund occupied a fiduciary
relationship to it and could not sell that position for a profit.
The profit in that situation amounted to pennies per share.
But the point here is that the case set a standard of conduct
for an entire industry.
The same could be said of many of the other notable
victories of Abe and his partners: Perlman v. Feldmann,
2
Moses v. Burgin,' and Fogel v. Chestnutt,
4 to name a few.
None of those derivative actions involved large recoveries for
the corporations for whom they were brought. And certainly if
you calculated the recoveries on a share by share basis, they
would have been picayune. But they were of immeasurable
importance to the integrity of corporate governance by setting
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standards for corporate actors. So, I would agree with Jim that
the success of the derivative actions must not be measured
solely in compensatory terms.
Now, with respect to the class action, here again we hear
that the shareholders receive pennies on the dollar. This
negative perception is what drives so much of the argument.
The perception, however, is far removed from reality.
In 1998, the cash component of securities class action
settlements-just securities settlements-was over $2 billion.5
Now, that is a lot of pennies. And in the years prior we saw
similar extraordinarily large recoveries on behalf of class
members.
So, where do we get this notion of pennies on the dollar?
The answer, I submit to you, lies in nothing more than
advocacy of those who oppose the class actions and the
tremendous amount of corporate resources that have been used
to perpetuate that myth.
Advocates of those seeking to diminish the effectiveness of
the class actions, cloaking themselves as reformers, put these
various positions before Congress in 1995. But many of those
positions they have now walked away from, or they have been
discredited by others. I doubt that there is a person sitting in
this room today who hasn't heard the hue and cry that a class
action suit is virtually a Pavlovian response to a 10% price
drop in a stock, that as sure as night follows day, after that
drop there is a class action lawsuit.
But in a paper prepared by Professor Charles Yablon of
Cardozo Law School, which is scheduled for publication in the
Northwestern University Law Review, he discusses a recent
study of securities class actions by the noted academicians,
Professors Carlton and Weiss, and another independently
prepared by Joe Grundfest of Stanford. Yablon says that they
are all in accord, and I quote here: "[The claim that 10% stock
drops automatically result in the filing of a securities class
' See Securities Class Action Alert, Settlement Summary Table, at 30 (Jan.
1999).
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action appears to be untenable."6 While the revelation of facts
supporting a securities case will typically result in a large
decline, the converse is not true.
Well, congratulations. This is what we at the plaintiffs' bar
have been explaining for years. This is what we argued before
Congress, before the passage of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995.' All that was needed to debunk
this myth was to review The Wall Street Journal any day of
the week to see that there are at least 100 companies whose
shares declined at least 10% the previous day. But this
perception is still promoted to this day.
Now, let's get back, if we can, to the pennies-on-the-dollar
argument. To determine the relationship of a settlement to the
potential damage recovery, obviously one must make an
assessment of what the damages are. That valuation is far
from anything that experts will agree upon.
Again, Carlton and Weiss now concede, after the Reform
Act was passed, that "unambiguous observation of investors'
damages is impossible."' Of course, when arguing their cases
before the court, the plaintiffs will bias the damage number
upwards. At settlement negotiations or at trial, plaintiffs come
in with their damage studies, which are high, and predictably
the defendants will come in with their damage studies showing
that they're just a fraction of that. Yet it is the plaintiffs'
calculations which the class action critics use in support of
their pennies-on-the-dollar argument.
In one recent case that I settled, we had attended
negotiations before a former federal judge, and we had with us
our expert, a noted Stanford University economist, who had
damage estimates of approximately $60 million for that case.
The defendants came in with a noted professor from the Stern
School of Business at NYU. His damage estimate was $4
million for the same case. The case settled for $20 million.
Pennies on the dollar? Well, you tell me.
' Charles M. Yablon, A Dangerous Supplement?: Longshot Claims and Private
Securities Litigation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2000).
7 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) [hereinafter Reform Act].
' Willard T. Carleton et al., Securities Class Action Lawsuits: A Descriptive
Study, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 491, 492 n.5 (1996).
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Now, Jim, I believe you point out in your paper that
empirical data released after the passage of the Reform Act
show that in approximately 83% of the cases studied, the
settlements represented a significant portion of the damages
estimated for the case. Yet it is on this very faulty pennies-on-
the-dollar perception that so much of the debate and so much
of the criticism is based. So much so that Jim is prepared to
throw up the flag and agree that viewing success of these cases
against compensatory measures dooms them to failure.
Another strongly agreed point casting shadows on
securities class actions is that cases which settle for under $2
million are frivolous. There has been so much written on the
subject that academics have accepted this as a given. But the
fact is, a study just announced, again after passage of the
Reform Act, that of more than 200 corporate fraud cases
brought by the SEC between 1987 and 1997 related to
financial statement fraud, the majority of those cases involved
companies with capitalizations of under $100 million.9 The
cases are small, the damages are small, the insurance policy (if
it exists) is small, and the settlement is small.
Now, I have to tell you I was on a panel like this several
years ago down in Washington, D.C. with District Court Judge
Stanley Sporkin. He was highly critical of the plaintiffs' bar.
He said, "Stan, you guys only go after the big money cases.
There's a lot of fraud involving small companies. You guys
have an obligation to bring those suits as well." So, if you bring
them and you settle them for small amounts, you're damned. If
you don't bring them, you're damned as well.
Now, I agree if there are problems with the class actions,
we should address them. But if the problems are with the
perceptions, we should address those as well. Let us not
merely accept the faulty perception and proceed from there.
I would like to pick up on some observations of Jim
concerning the private aspects of the class action and the
settlement process; I do believe that there are improvements
that could be made here.
' See Elizabeth MacDonald & Joann S. Lublin, Proposals for Strengthening
Corporate Audit Panels Influenced by New Data, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 1999, at
A2.
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I would suggest that a big step forward could be taken if
the courts would remove the cloak of secrecy concerning the
evidence uncovered during the discovery process. At the
commencement of these litigations there is the obligatory
announcement by the defendants that they did nothing wrong,
that the case against them is nothing but a nuisance suit, and
that the case will be defended vigorously. When the case
settles, whether it be for $10 million, $20 million or $100
million, defendants again announce that the case was
meritless and that it was settled to avoid the distraction,
inconvenience, and burden of further litigation.
The public never learns the true facts underlying these
claims, because discovery is taken pursuant to protective
orders, making the most critical evidence in the case
unavailable to the public, no matter how egregious the
conduct. The evidence is sealed forever. Neither the class
members nor the future shareholders will know whether there
was serious wrongdoing perpetrated by the trustees of their
investments.
If class actions are to serve a social purpose, and I agree
that they should, it is important that these facts be made
publicly available. The courts should not block significant
corporate wrongdoing from public scrutiny. The court should
require that the briefs in support of the settlement discuss
those findings made in discovery. The notice to the class
should make specific reference to the availability of the briefs
and their discussions of the legal and factual issues in the
case. I submit that the disclosure of that information would go
far not only in meeting the concerns about the private nature
of these cases and their settlements, but would add greatly to
the deterrent effect.
The disclosure of this information would be particularly
significant given what we are seeing as a change in the
composition of the class actions. Regarding the members of a
class since the passage of the Reform Act, as Jim mentioned,
one of the things that Congress intended was to bring large
institutions into these cases to be the representative class
members. In that connection, notice goes out, typically on wire
services, on the Internet, etc., announcing the filing of the case
and inviting shareholders to come join the action.
1999]
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Well, we have not found that there are a great number of
institutions coming in. But what we have found is that there
are hundreds and in some cases thousands of investors in
those companies who have come forward and expressed their
willingness and desire to act as lead plaintiffs. In order to do
that, they must file a document certifying that they are
prepared to testify at a deposition, that they are prepared to
come and testify at trial, and that they will receive no
compensation for doing so.
Now, you have a very active class constituency that you
have never seen before. You have people whose level of
sophistication has increased immeasurably over the years
because of everyone's involvement, through mutual funds or
otherwise, in the securities market.
If there is a settlement that is inadequate, you have a
group of interested people who are not only active but well
informed. They're informed not only by the class notices
approved by the court, but in some jurisdictions the courts
require that pleadings and briefs be filed and posted on the
various wire services to be available for full evaluation by the
class members.
I suggest to you that if there is an inadequate settlement,
you have a group of people out there ready to go into court and
attack it. If they were willing to come in and at their own
expense serve as lead plaintiffs in an action, you can be sure
that when the money is on the table for a settlement, but is
inadequate, these people have the means, the sophistication,
and good reason to come in and object.
I'd like to briefly comment on the issue of insurance; it's a
very serious problem, of course. I think Jim in another paper
has observed that most companies do buy sufficient insurance
to cover the risks that they are exposed to. And it's obviously
extremely difficult to attract good directors to a public
corporation if you don't have that insurance in place.
We would like very much in most of our cases to obtain
contributions to the settlements by the individual defendants. I
think that it would be terrific for a number of reasons, which
you've expressed. But it's difficult. The settlement process for
those of us who have been involved in complex actions
involving large sums of money can be as difficult as the
litigation itself.
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Just imagine that you have this $100 million that Jim
referred to before in terms of settlement. You are attempting
to negotiate with the individuals to make a contribution to that
settlement. And they're not willing.
Now, sure, these shareholder suits are supposed to have a
deterrent effect, but their principal purpose for our clients is
compensatory. Do we walk away from the $100 million that's
available to our clients if it's a good settlement because an
individual won't make what's most likely to be a marginal
contribution to the settlement? I don't think so.
I think a way to approach this problem is not to impose a
requirement in the class action to demonstrate to the court
why the individuals didn't contribute, but in the derivative
action. After all, in many of these cases the proper derivative
action would lie. It's the corporation that has been damaged by
the wrongdoing of its officers and directors. And a shareholder
derivative action can lie if you get over that very difficult
burden, which you referred to before as a demand on the
directors, to bring the action first.
I would suggest that in the court's determination of
whether or not to permit that derivative case to go forward the
defendant should have the burden of showing why they did not
contribute to the settlement. Let the court assess those
justifications. And if the reasons do not justify the failure to
make the contribution, let the derivative action go forward and
let the recovery be made there.
I'd just like to comment on the thought with respect to
consideration of merits on the class certification issue. I think
that would depend very greatly on when the class is to be
certified. The class is supposed to be certified at an early stage
of the litigation, a stage of the litigation when typically we on
the plaintiffs' side have available in terms of merits only public
disclosures made by the corporation itself. We have not yet had
an opportunity to see that hard evidence, to see the soft
underbelly of the defendants in the case.
So, if there's going to be consideration of the merits in
connection with class certification, I think it should be far
down the litigation road, when the plaintiffs have had an
opportunity to take discovery and to demonstrate to the court
whether or not the case justifies being prosecuted. If it is
certified, let the defendants take their risk at that point.
1999]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
Let me just conclude by going back to Jim's beginning,
where he suggests that the Supreme Court has abandoned its
positive view of the private securities lawsuit that it had
stated was so important back in the Borak0 decision.
In 1985, in Bateman Eichler," a decade after Blue
Chip,2 and again in 1986 in Randall," the Supreme Court
repeated once again the exact words of Borak and placed
emphasis upon the importance of the private securities action
in the enforcement of the securities laws. I submit that in Blue
Chip the Court was not condemning the securities class action,
but recognizing the dangers when it's misused.
As Madison said, "'Some degree of abuse is inseparable
from the proper use of everything.'"'4 Shareholder derivative
suits or class actions are not immune from that. But the
current climate on Wall Street, perhaps more than ever,
requires the vigilance of those prosecuting these cases, both in
the public and the private sector. The public sector has already
admitted it does not have the resources to cope with the
problems. In the past 12 months numerous corporations have
been forced to restate their financial statements previously
issued to the public because of accounting irregularities. At the
same time, the basis of executive compensation has changed
dramatically, so that executives have the potential of reaping
tens and in some cases hundreds of millions of dollars in
potential bonuses if their stock options pan out. The
motivation to control and to distort corporate information has
probably never been greater.
If there are issues relating to the shareholder litigation,
let us be cautious about how we attempt to deal with them,
because the alternatives could be very damaging to what has
been a very credible securities market in this country.
'o J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
n Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299 (1985).
12 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
1 Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647 (1986).
1 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (quoting 4
ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 571 (1876)).
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